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The Classical Review
JUNE 1896.
THE 'PROVOCATIO MILITIAE" AND PROVINCIAL JURISDICTION.
IN the early Republic we know that the
right of criminal appeal did not extend
beyond the limits of one mile from the city
(Liv. 3, 20 ' neque enim provocationem esse
longius ab urbe mille passuum'). I t is a
matter of considerable importance in the
development of criminal procedure at Rome
to determine whether these limits were ever
exceeded: whether, as the city state ex-
panded to include Italy and then the
provinces, the bounds of the ' provocatio'
kept pace with this expansion, and whether
the Roman citizen, in whatever part of the
Roman world he found himself, could
eventually make a legal claim to this right
of appeal. The importance of this question
is due to the fact that, in the later stages of
Republican history, we are not concerned
merely with a relic of popular sovereignty
which was almost extinct and only resorted
to when the cumbrous, machinery of the
' comitia' was put in motion for judicial
purposes. The ' provocatio' is the basis of
the whole criminal jurisdiction at Rome,
and the right of appeal at the end of the
Republic is the right to be tried in certain
of the standing courts (quaestiones perpetuae)
which had replaced the popular jurisdiction
of the ' comitia.' I t must be remarked,
however, that if the ' provocatio' was
extended beyond its original limits, it cer-
tainly did not give a right to be tried in all
these courts, since the jurisdiction of some
of them was limited by law. Thus
the ' lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis'
only took cognizance of murders which had
taken place in Rome and within a mile of
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the city.1 But, on the whole, the appeal is
the claim of a Roman citizen to be tried
before the courts of the central state, and,
consequently, when we find the ' provocatio '
extended to Latins during the last period of
the Republic (Lex Acilia Rep. 1. 78), one at
least of the meanings of this extension must
be that these Latins could exercise a choice of
jurisdiction between Roman courts and those
of their native towns.
The early writers on Roman constitutional
law, at least from the time of Conradi,
recognized vaguely that, at the end of the
Republic, there was some guarantee of pro-
tection extended to the lives of Roman
citizens against the jurisdiction of the
governors of the provinces. Evidence for
this fact appeared to be furnished by Cicero's
diatribe against Verres for the crucifixion
of a Roman citizen in Sicily. But they did
not suppose any legal extension of the right
of appeal, which is never mentioned by our
authorities, and is indeed, as we shall see,
1
 Collatio, i. 3 : ' Capite primo legis Corneliae de
sicariis eavetur, ut is praetor judexve quaestionis, cui
sorte obvenerit quaestio de sicariis, ejus quod in urbe
Roma propiusve mille passus factum sit, uti quaerat
cum judicibus, &c.' They are the old limits of the
'provocatio,' and must in this case have continued
to the end of the Republic. That they had ceased to
exist in the early Principate seems shown by the pro-
cedure connected with the trial of Piso for the murder
of Germanicus. Although the imputed crime had
been committed in a province, it is mentioned as a
possibility that Piso should be tried before this
'quaestio' (Tac. Ann. 3, 12, 10). The early limita-
tions of this kind may have been done away with by
the 'lex Julia de judiciis ordinandis' or 'judiciorum
publicorum.'
Q
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implicitly denied by Cicero. This view has,
however, been taken by some recent writers,1
and it is possible that, in spite of the
apparently contradictory evidence, it may
be correct. It may be of some value, how-
ever, to point out (perhaps for the first time,
for I have seen no thorough discussion of
the subject) how contradictory this evidence
is, and to attempt to show that this theory
has been too absolutely stated, and that, if
held at all, it can be held only in an
exceedingly modified form.
Historically, the ' provocatio' should have
been extended to Italy before it was extended
to the provinces. It is true that the term
' militiae' covers both, and, when the
original limits were disregarded, both spheres
of administration might have been included
at the same time. Yet there seems to have
been a pressing necessity for the 'provocatio'
to be extended to Italy at a very early
period of the history of Rome. The neces-
sity was due to the existence of citizen
colonies, the ' praefecturae.' Members of
these colonies possessed ' communio comitio-
rum'' and therefore the ' provocatio.' How
was it exercised outside the limits of the
city domain? There is no evidence to show
that it was ever exercised outside these
limits; yet protection against the magistrate
must have been granted to these Roman
residents in Italy. Although there are no
actual instances to guide us, the most
reasonable solution of the problem seems to
be that, when such a resident had committed
a crime, the punishment for which would
lead inevitably to the ' provocatio,' he was
arrested and brought within the sphere,with-
in which alone such an appeal could legally
be made. He was then qualified to be tried
in the ordinary way by a ' judicium populi.'
That such must have been the procedure
employed for crimes committed by Roman
citizens in Italy is shown by a curious
application of the principle, which dates
from the second Punic war. Q. Pleminius,
' propraetor' and ' legatus' of Scipio
Africanus, in the year 205 B.C. plundered
the town of Locri in Southern Italy, and a
complaint was lodged by Locrian envoys
before the Senate. The Senate appointed a
commission to investigate the matter, and
the commission (' praetor et consilium')
found Pleminius and his accomplices guilty
(' damnaverunt') and sent them in chains to
Roma Pleminius died in prison before the
1
 E.g. Rudorff, XSm. RecUsgesch. j . p. 25 ; Beth-
mann-Hollweg, Civilprozess, ii. pp. 34 and 99 ;
Mommsen, Stacdsrecte, ii. p, 117; Willems, Le droit
public Momain, p, 821,
close of the ' judicium populi' which was
investigating his crime (Liv. 29, 21 and 22).
The use of the equivocal word ' damnave-
runt,' employed to describe the judgment of
the commission, has led Geib2 and Mommsen s
to suppose that we have here a unique case
of an appeal from the judgment of a special
judicial commission. But Livy's account of
the appointment of this board shows that its
functions were not meant to be judicial. I t
was a commission appointed by the Senate
to investigate and report, primarily on the
responsibility of Scipio Africanus for the
conduct of his lieutenant. The commission
concluded its functions by arresting the
parties found guilty as a result of its
inquiries and sending them home for trial.
There was no sentence and therefore no
appeal, but the right of Pleminius to be
tried before the people could only be asserted
inside the ancient limits, within which alone
the ' provocatio ' was possible. The other
explanation, besides the difficulty it involves
of an appeal from a special judicial commis-
sion, would necessarily imply that the right
of appeal was legally extended beyond the
ancient limits in the year 205 B.C. This
view has, however, never been held. The
usual date to which such an extension has
been assigned by those who hold that it was
actually realized is almost a century later.
The evidence on which this view of a later
extension rests is gathered from a passage
which refers, strangely enough, to discipline
in the army. It is strange, because we
should have imagined that, had any excep-
tions been made to the universality of the
appeal (and that there were exceptions even
after this period is undoubted) these would
certainly have been found in favour of
offences against military discipline. Yet
during the Jugurthine war we are told that
an officer, who had been appointed prefect of
one of the conquered towns of Nuinidia
garrisoned by Roman troops, and who had
deserted his post, was condemned, scourged,
and executed by Metellus, ' nam is civis ex
Latio erat ' (Sallust, Jug. 69). Unfortu-
nately the words which give the justification
for this execution are susceptible of two
different interpretations, which in their turn
present two wholly different issues in con-
stitutional law. ' Civis ex Latio ' may con-
ceivably be an expression modelled on other
qualified uses of the word ' civis' such as
' civis sine suffragio ' ; for ' Latinus' here can
hardly be taken as equivalent to a local
designation, the term, when unqualified,
2
 Criminalprocess, p. 161.
3
 Staalsrecht, ii. p. 117.
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having in Sallust's time merely a juristic
and not an ethnic signification. In this
case the ground for Metellus' execution of
the officer would have been that he was a
Latin, and the words contain an implication
that a Roman citizen would have been
exempt from such summary punishment.
But the use of the expression 'civis ex
Latio ' for ' Latinus ' is unparalleled, and
the words are subject to a more reasonable
interpretation if we remember that the
designation ' civis Romanus' tended to be
restricted to the inhabitants of the capital
(Forcellini s. v. ' civis ') and that individuals
who had attained citizenship by other means
than that of birth in the Roman community
would naturally be designated by a qualifying
epithet. ' Civis ex Latio' would in fact be
the expression we should expect to find
employed to describe a member of a Latin
community who had acquired citizenship
through holding a magistracy in his native
town. Such a position would almost cer-
tainly have been attained by a man who was
of sufficient importance to be the prefect of
a garrisoned town and who was in the
immediate retinue of Metellus (Plut. Mar. 8).
According to this interpretation the explana-
tory clause implies that Latins were exempt
from punishment by Roman commanders on
military service, and Sallust is explaining
why, though a Latin by origin, Turpilius
was yet subject to the martial law of Rome.
This exemption had been granted to the
Latins by a law of the elder Livius Drusus
(Plut. G. Gracch. 9), and there is no reason
for regarding this law as having become
extinct within fourteen or fifteen years of
its enactment. Individual inquirers will no
doubt form different judgments as to the
respective probability of these two conclu-
sions ; but it must be admitted that the
sole instance which we possess of the denial
of the jurisdiction of an ' Imperator ' in the
field is, to say the least, an extremely
doubtful one; and, if even we hold that
Turpilius was a Latin, we shall perhaps find
an explanation of Metellus' motives which
does not necessitate the view that the
' provocatio' ever existed legally against the
command of an Imperator.
In any case the sole instance which we
possess refers only to martial law on a
military expedition. No case is known of
the jurisdiction of a provincial governor
over a Roman citizen having been success-
fully challenged; and, before we proceed
further in our inquiry into the reality of
the extension of the ' provocatio' to the
provinces, it will be necessary to determine
whether the term ' militiae' is a simple
conception, whether the same rules neces-
sarily held good for service in the field and
for ordinary provincial jurisdiction. The
best evidence on this point is gathered from
the ' lex Julia de vi publica.' This law
proves, as we shall see, that the conception
was the same, and that any limitations on
the powers of the magistrates ' militiae'
affected both spheres of administration ; but
it also proves that special reservations
might be made in favour of the one or of
the other. I t will, therefore, be necessary
to examine separately the evidences we
possess for military jurisdiction on the one
hand, and for ordinary criminal jurisdiction
in the provinces on the other.
As regards military discipline a strong
evidence that the old rigour of the Roman
martial law was preserved to the 'end of
the Republic is to be found in the principle
laid down in the De legibus of Cicero
(3, 3, 6), ' militiae ab eo, qui imperabit,
provocatio ne esto.' I t is one of the most
curious instances of the application of
a priori principles of criticism to evidence
that, while the Laws of Cicero are sup-
posed to reflect with a singular degree of
accuracy the public law of Rome, this
principle should almost alone be singled out
as expressing a ' pious wish' of the author
(Mommsen, Staatsrecht ii. 117, n. 2).1 All
that we hear of the maintenance of military
discipline at the close of the Republic (with
the exception of the single doubtful instance
noticed above) bears out Cicero's statement.
The right of appeal, if strictly interpreted,
should have abolished flogging in the army;
yet the vitis was still used on the backs of
the Roman legionaries in 134 B.C. (Liv.
Ep. 57),2 and the exceptions made by the
1
 Another unhistorical statement of Cicero's in the
De legibus has been found by some in the words
' magistrates nee oboedientem et noxium ci vem multa,
vinculis, verberibics coerceto' (3, 3 ; Bethmann-
Hollweg, Civilprozess, i. p. 95, note 32). But they
are immediately qualified by the words which follow:
'ni par majorve potestas populusve prohibessit, ad
quos provocatio esto.' The lex Porcia prohibited
the scourging of a Roman citizen by a ' gravis poena,'
but that it technically submitted the threat of such
' coercitio' to appeal is shown by the fact that the
law is classed amongst those regulating the ' provo-
catio.' Hence Cicero's statement of the extent of
the ' coercitio' of a Roman magistrate is correct from
a juristic point of view.
* 'Quern militem extra ordinem deprehendit
(Scipio Africanus), si Romanus esset, vitibus ; si ex-
traneus, fustibus cecidit.' This distinction—whether
it refers to a period before or after the supposed ex-
tension of the ' provocatio '-~i8 characteristic of the
care for the ' Roman name' which formed the safe-
guard of Romans in the provinces: bnt it is not a
Q2
228 THE CLASSICAL REVIEW.
' lex Julia' in favour of this punishment
probably reflect the later Republican law.
The language in which Plutarch describes
the law of Drusus passed in favour of the
Latins seems clearly to imply that flogging
existed in all branches of the army at the
time. The novelty of the law consisted in
its giving immunity from scourging ' even
on service.'1 Drusus did actually outbid
Gaius Gracchus in his grants to the Latins
by conferring on them a right not possessed
by Roman citizens. Instances of the capital
punishment of soldiers are numerous, and
fully bear out Cicero's injunction with
respect to magistrates in the field, 'Capitalia
vindicanto' {De leg. I.e.). Decimation was
employed by Crassus during the servile war
(Plut. Crassus 10), and there are frequent
instances of its use during the civil wars,
though these are perhaps not a safe index
of its legality. But the severest kind of
capital punishment recognized in the Roman
army, the ' fustuarium,' is mentioned by
Cicero as existing in his own day {Phil. 3,
6, 14) and was actually inflicted on a
' primus pilus' by Calvinus proconsul of
Spain in B.C. 39 {Veil. 2, 78); its employ-
ment on this occasion is mentioned as un-
usual but not as illegal. If the so-called
' leges militares' dealt with questions of
discipline,2 the extension of the 'provocatio'
must have been combined with many ex-
ceptions in favour of these laws.
, If we turn now to the ordinary criminal
jurisdiction of Roman governors in the
provinces, we have indeed abundant evidence
that a protest was raised against the in-
fliction of capital punishments—especially
disgraceful punishments such as crucifixion
—on Roman citizens, but we have no
evidence that it was illegal. Cicero's appeal
in the famous passage of the Verrines is
throughout to the injury done to the ' Roman
name' in the eyes of the provincials by
Verres' action ; he appeals to the precedents
of the ' lex Porcia ' and the ' lex Sempronia,'
not to any law that made Verres' act
illegal. When an advocate has a law that
exactly fits his case, he quotes i t; when he
legal distinction. ' Fustibus' here, if read instead
of ' virgis,' which has been suggesied, cannot refer to
•the punishment known as the 'fustuarium.' For a
somewhat similar distinction between the modes of
corporal punishment inflicted on a Hellene of Alex-
andria and on a native Egyptian, see Philo, in Flacc.
10; Mommsen, Provinces, ii. p. 240.
1
 ifirais iafi' M ffTparelas ^|p riva Aarivav p&fiSois
aMaaaBai (Plut. C. Oraceh. 9).
2
 'Leges militares' are mentioned in Cio. pro
Flacco 32, 77, and Livy 7, 41, but only as conferring
rights on the soldiers.
has not, he appeals to principles of the
constitution. This is Cicero's procedure
here. The force and the weakness of his
legal argument can only be estimated by
reading the whole passage {in Verr. v. 63,
163-170). The conclusion is that it is a
' facinus' to put a Roman citizen in bonds,
a ' scelus' to scourge him, ' prope parrici-
dium ' to put him to death (§ 170). All
this is true, but had any of these acts been
illegal, Cicero would have told us so. The
passage where the legal argument is closest
exhibits its inherent weakness best, ' O
nomen dulce libertatis! O jus eximium
nostrae civitatis! O lex Porcia legesque
Semproniae ! O graviter desiderata et ali-
quando reddita plebi Romanae tribunicia
potestas ! ' The ' tribunicia potestas ' is
put on a level with the laws establishing
' provocatio.' But it is well known that
the former did not extend beyond the limits
of the city. Why should the latter have
done so ? A further evidence that Verres'
action was not illegal is shown by Cicero's
threat to prosecute him for ' perduellio ' in
a ' judicium populi' {in Verr. 1, 5). The
threat was, perhaps, an idle one; but it
shows that the offence could not have been
classed either as 'perduellio' or as 'majestas'
in the ' leges de majestate' or ' de vi'—in
other words, that the laws establishing the
criminal courts of Rome, which took cog-
nizance of such offences, did not reckon it
as a crime.
The records of criminal jurisdiction in
the provinces are exceedingly scanty for the
time of the Republic; yet, scanty as they
are, they show us both the threat, and
apparently the execution, of capital punish-
ment on Roman citizens. Diodorus (37,
5, 2) preserves a tradition that Q. Mucius
Scaevola when governor of the province of
Asia (probably in 98 B.C.) pronounced
capital sentences on ' publicani,' 3 and he
seems to imply that these sentences were
carried out.4
3
 Diod. I.e. KaraS'iKovs iv aira/Tiv hotel robs Srifio-
m&vas, Kal ras fikv apyvpueds f}\d/$as TOIS TfdtKijfievois
eKTiveiv ijviiyKafe, TCI de BavariKci Ttov 4yK\i)^iarwv
ill-iov Kpltreas SavaTinrjs.
* Diod. I.e. § 4, Kal trvvefraive robs o\lyc/> •np6'Ttpov Sta
T)\V KaratppSvrjffty Kal irKeove^tav ir6\\a vapayofiovvras
trap' 4\irlSas vwb rav iiSiKrifievav anriyeaQcu npbs robs
KaraSlxovs. airiyeaBai (duci) may refer to any kind
of imprisonment, but may be used in the sense in
which Pliny employs ' duci' (ad Traj. 96, 3 : ' per-
eeverantes duci jussi'). That Diodorus understands
the 'publicani' themselves and not merely the
' familia publicanorum ' to have been the objects of
Scaevola's sentences is shown by the word rolrwv in
the story which follows (§ 3): ore SJ) rbv Kopu<pa~ov
rovTuv otKov6fiov} 5t5tf^To fiiv iinsp TT/S £\evdcpias
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Cicero also furnishes more direct evi-
dence than that contained in his speeches of
the possibility of the death penalty being
inflicted by a provincial governor on a
Roman. Writing to his brother who was
' propraetor' of Asia, and commenting on
the criminal jurisdiction of the latter, he
says (ad Q. fr. 1, 2, 5), ' ecce supra caput
homo levis ac sordidus, sed tamen eguestri
censu Catienus.' Quintus, it appears, had
already condemned his father, and writes to
the son, 'ilium crucem sibi ipsum con-
stituere, ex qua tu eum ante detraxisses;
te curaturum, fumo (or in furno) ut combu-
reretur, plaudente tota provincial The man
was apparently a Roman 'eques,' and Quintus
threatens to put him to death. As he is
described as ' asperior' to the father, and
the provincial governor in his dealings with
Roman citizens had apparently no choice
between a fine and a capital punishment,1
the death penalty had perhaps been inflicted
in this case as well. M. Cicero, while com-
menting on the brutality of the language,
does not give a hint of the illegality of the
procedure threatened, although elsewhere
he takes Quintus to task for legal irregu-
larities of a far smaller kind (ad Qu. 1, 2, 3).
Making all allowances for the exaggeration
of expression, it is not altogether an unfair
conclusion to draw from a passage such as
this that the right of a Roman citizen to be
tried at Rome on a capital charge could not
yet have established itself, or at any rate
that it could not have been a universal
legal proviso.
If we ask finally by what law the ' pro-
vocatio' was so extended, the choice has
generally been supposed to lie between the
' lex Sempronia' of C. Gracchus2 and one
of the ; leges Porciae.'3 Of the ' lex
Sempronia' we know too little to assert
whether such a conclusion is justified or
not. That the law prohibiting a 'judicium'
dealing with the ' caput' of a Roman
citizen from being established without the
consent of the people (Cic. pro Rab. 4, 12)
may have been so widely framed as to be
susceptible of the interpretation that it
Ta Kal ffvfnre<pa>vttK6ra irpbs robs Kvpiovs,
<t>6d<ras T V inrohvTpoioiv Kal davdrov KaraStKaffas
avearaipwoev. Diodorus implies that the reason why
Scaevola anticipated the emancipation of the man
was, not that he might be able to execute capital
punishment, but that he might be able to inflict the
' servile supplicium' of crucifixion.
1
 Unless relegation from the limits of the province
was practised in the Republic. Imprisonment was
not recognized as a punishment in Roman criminal
law.
2
 Rudorff, MSm. Eechlsg. i. p. 25.
3
 Mommsen, Slaalsr. ij. p. 117.
limited the jurisdiction of provincial gov-
ernors, is possible ; that C. Gracchus meant
it to be so applied, or that pro-magistrates
as well as magistrates were mentioned in
the sanction preserved by Plutarch,4 is un-
likely, since his immediate object seems to
have been simply to limit the power of the
senate to establish ' quaestiones.' About the
' leges Porciae' we have more positive evi-
dence. Cicero tells us that the three laws
which bore this title introduced no novelty
in the principle of the 'provoca,tio' beyond
their sanction.6 The well-known coin of
P. Porcius Laeca, with the word • provoco '
on it, first cited, I believe, in connection
with the ' provocatio ' by Conradi,6 which is
regarded by Mommsen 7 as a token of the
extension of the appeal to the provinces,
really proves nothing. The figures of the
lictor and of the prisoner with upraised
hand are as applicable to the ' provocatio '
within as without the city; the fact that the
' imperator ' appealed against is ' paludatus'
need only show the denial of the military
1
 imperium' within the city, and the coin
may have been struck by any member of
the house which had produced three cham-
pions of freedom. Against such an ex-
tension must also be set the facts noticed
above of the limited jurisdiction of certain
criminal courts at Rome and the apparent
absence of a legal sanction in the criminal
laws for enforcing this proviso.8
Yet, if on this evidence we decline to
admit the existence of a definite law
extending the appeal to the provinces, there
can be little doubt than an unwritten rule
did tend to limit the competence of provincial
governors. This is sufficiently explained by
the character of their jurisdiction and by
the position of the Romans in the provinces.
The jurisdiction of the governor did not
rest on leges. The 'quaestiones' in the
4
 0. Gracch. 4 : rhv Se (v6/iov eiVe'$epe), ti rts
&pXa>v Hxpnov ixKexripix01 To\irt\v, xar' avrov StSivra
l 5^p $ g
5
 de Eepiib. 2, 3 1 : 'neque vero leges Porciae, quae
tres sunt trium Porciorum, ut scitis, quidquajn
praeter sanctionem attulerunt novi.'
6
 Jus provocation^, p. 15, cf. Woniger, Provoca-
tionsverfahren, p. 302.
7
 Staatsrecht, ii. p. 117, n. 2. The earliest writer
known to me who drew this deduction from the coin
was Labowlaye, Essai sur Us lots criminelles Bomaines
(Paris, 1845), p. 94. He assigns the law to Porcius
Laeca, tribune 197 B.C.
8
 It is of course possible that the law was protected
by its own sanction, which would give rise to a
'judicium populi,' and it might be thought that
Cicero was appealing to this in his threat to prose-
cute Verres before the people. But had there been a
definite law with a definite sanction Cicero must have
mentioned them.
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Republic held good only for Italy, and it
was by these alone that what were generally
understood as ' capital' penalties (exile and
interdiction) could be imposed. The 'lex
Julia de vi publica,' in defining the powers of
governors, contains no mention of a capital
genalty other than the death penalty.1 In
the exercise of their jurisdiction over
Roman citizens we should expect
governors to model the exercise of their
powers on the principles valid at Home
where the death penalty had disappeared.
Added to this was the necessity, dwelt on
by Cicero in the Verrines, of keeping up the
dignity of the Roman name in the
provinces ; it is the immunity from capital
punishment, above all from the death
penalty in a degrading form,2 that protects
him amongst barbarous nations. Where
this motive is not present, there the death
penalty is retained, and hence the hands of
the ' imperator' in the field are sometimes
free while those of the 'proconsul' or
'propraetor' are tied by custom. It is,
perhaps, due to the fact that the citizen is
protected by law at Rome, by custom in the
provinces, that, while in the one case he
says ' provoco' against the decree of the
magistrate, in the other be asserts his
claim by the words ' civis Romanus sum'
(Cic. in Verr. v. 166 and 169). In any
case the latter words are an admirable
illustration of the motive that underlay this
partial extension of the appeal.
The whole subject of criminal jurisdiction
' militiae' during the Republic furnishes
an admirable illustration of a profound
remark of Ihering's (Geist des Romischen
Reckts, ii. p. 280, note 444), 'Es ware ein
verdienstliches TJnternehmen, anstatt wie
bisher bei der Bearbeitung des romischen
Staatsrechts sich durch den zweck leiten zu
lassen, iiberall bestimmte und sichere
Grundsatze zu gewinnen, umgekerht einmal
die Controversen derselben zu constatiren.'
The conflict of evidence, the-weak arguments
of Cicero, all show a controversy. The
' provocatio' could not have been extended
in' the simple way supposed. Its place
must have be'en taken by some unwritten
principle. Or, if we still hold that a legal
principle existed, it must have been main-
tained with considerable reservations both in
favour of military discipline and in favour
of the punishment of certain offences.
1
 Later the capital penalty of 'deportation' was
introduced for the provinces, but it was, as we should
expect, prohibited to governors.
Cf. Cic. pro Babir. 5, 17.
Writers on criminal law, such -as Geib,3
who have not held the theory of an ex-
tension of the ' provocatio' have sometimes
substituted for it a power supposed to have
been possessed by the tribunes of summoning
to Rome, on appeal, cases from the court of
the provincial governor. I t is an unlikely
power for the tribunes to have possessed,
since there is no other evidence of their
auxilivm having extended outside the city
walls; and the only passage on which the
procedure rests is so incorrect in its details
that little weight can be attached to it.
Plutarch (Caes. 4) tells us that Caesar, out
of gratitude to the Greeks for the assistance
which they had rendered him in his
impeachment of Dolabella, assisted them in
the prosecution of P. Antonius for bribery
before Marcus Lucullus propraetor (o-T/ranj-
yoC) of Macedonia. He continues nal
TotrovTov io-^«o-£v, wore TOV AVTWVIOV c7riKa\£-
(Ta<r6cu TOIIS SrjfJMpxovs, crKfjipafntvov oi>x *X€lv
TO l o w ev TJJ 'EAA.ao'i irpos "EAA^ras. I t is
undoubtedly the same story as that told of
C. Antonius by Q. Cicero in the letter ' de
petitione consulatus' (§ 8) and by Asconius
(in or at. in tog. cand. p. 111). These
accounts show that Plutarch is mistaken,
nob only in the character of the trial but in
the more important detail as to where it
took place. Antonius was tried for repe-
tundae at Rome, and with Plutarch's
narrative vanishes the only evidence for a
summons to Rome from the provincial
governor's jurisdiction.4
The first positive enactment which we
hear of as directly limiting the competence
of provincial governors is the lex Julia de vi
publica. The statement of the injunctions
of this law which is given by Paul us (Sent.
5, 26, 1) and Ulpian (in Big. 48, 6, 7)
represents it as accepting rather than as
creating the principle of the ' provocatio' to
Rome (Paula I.e. ' lege Julia de vi publica
damnatur, qui aliqua potestate praeditus
civem Romanum, antea ad populum, nunc ad
itnperatorem appellantem necarit necarive
jusserit,' <fcc. TJlpian I.e. ' civem Romanum
adversus provocationem necaverit verber-
3
 Criminalprocess, p. 251.
4
 Although Plutarch's narrative is wrong, his re-
presentation of the trial as having taken place in the
province contains no absurdity from a legal point of
view. Antonius had been only a legate in Macedonia,
and had he remained in the province either in a
private capacity or even as a legate, might have been
impeached before the provincial governor. More
usually the prosecution would have been lodged at
Home, and in this case even a legate might be sum-
moned back to take his trial, for he was not, like a
magistrate, exempt from prosecution. Cf. Cic ad
Att. iv. 15, 9.
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averit,' &c). So far as language goes they
both seem to represent it as merely supply-
ing a sanction for an already existing right
of appeal, as bearing, in short, to the
Republican legislation which extended the
'provocatio' to the provinces the same
relation as the ' leges Porciae' bore to the
earlier laws permitting the appeal in Rome
(Liv. 10, 9 ; Cic. de Rep. 2, 31). We may
notice further that the law strictly follows
the analogy of the Republican ' provocatio';
it enunciates again the curious principle of
Roman criminal legislation, which limits the
power of magistrates not by prohibiting
their right to sentence, but by prohibiting
execution. That it should follow this
analogy was inevitable, whether it was the
consequence of an unwritten rule or a posi-
tive enactment. But the language of the
jurists leaves it wholly uncertain which of
the two had preceded it. The ' provocatio'
of Ulpia'n need not refer to a time anteced-
ent to the passing of the law, for by limiting
competence the law creates the appeal.
The expression of Paulus 'antea ad popu-
lum—appellantem ' may refer to any time
between the passing of the law and the
centering of this jurisdiction in the em-
peror's hands, for the claim to be tried
before a ' quaestio' at Rome is technically
the ' provocatio ad populum' in its later
form. In these words, however, we probably
have a reminiscence of the early Republican
appeal, which had always formed the basis
of the limited jurisdiction of provincial
governors; but they do not state the belief,
still less the fact, that the limits of this
appeal were so wide as those prescribed by
the lex Julia. The exceptions made by the
law in favour of military discipline throw
considerable light on the legal practice of
the Republic. Exemptions are made in
favour of the 'tribuni militum' and the
' praefecti classium alarumve' with respect
to the punishment of military offences.
Nothing is said about the ' legatus legionis'
who had in the Empire the power of life and
death over the soldiers (Dio Cass. 52, 22,3).
If this clause of the law was passed by
Augustus and not by Caesar, we may regard
this power as specially delegated by the
emperor; but the true explanation of this
silence seems to be that the power of the
commander of the legion to execute capital
sentences was so undisputed that no excep-
tion was needed to confirm it.
After the passing of the lex Julia we
meet for the first time with a recognition of
the principle that Roman citizens should be
sent to Rome for trial on a capital charge
(Plin. a4 Traj. 96, 4 ' quia cives Romani
erant, adnotavi in urbem remittendos').
There they would naturally be tried before
the ' quaestiones,' unless the ' provocatio,' or
' appellatio' as it was now indifferently
called, was coupled with a request to be tried
before one of the high courts. , The case of
St. Paul has been taken to show that a
request for the jurisdiction of the emperor
was the usual accompaniment of such an
appeal, and that this practice prepared the
way for the final centralization of*such juris-
diction in the emperor's hands, which was
reached by the time of the early classical
jurists. But, arguing from the evidence
alone, such a simple solution is impossible
for the procedure of the early Principate,
which was directed by the provisions of the
' lex Julia.' The cases in which the law
was violated during this period are equal in
number to the cases of its observance,1 nor
can they be explained on general principles.
We do not know what justification Marius
Priscus had for scourging and strangling a
Roman knight in the province of Africa
(Plin. Ep. 2, 11), but Galba's crucifixion of
a tutor for poisoning his ward 2 could not
possibly have come under the only excep-
tions known to have been made by the
criminal laws.3 The legal theory in the
early Empire seems to have broken down in
some cases as completely as the quasi-legal
theory of the Republic ; and, as this cannot
have been a consequence of the weakness of
the central government, it must have been
due to administrative causes of which we
are ignorant.4 It is indeed almost impossible
1
 There are only two clear instances for the early
Principate, the appeal of St. Paul and Pliny's pro-
cedure with regard to those Christians who were
citizens {ad Traj. 96, 4). The passage sometimes
quoted from Dio Cassius (64, 2) is inconclusive, as it
speaks simply of an appeal to the emperor.
2
 Suet. Galba, 9: ' tutorem, quod pupillum, cui
suhstitutus heres erat, veneno necasset, cruce affixit;
implorantique leges et civem Romanum se testificanti,
quasi solatio et honore aliquo poenam levaturus,
mutari, multoque praeter ceteros altiorem et deal-
batam statui crucem jussit.' The words ' imploranti
leges' probably mean ' appealing for a legal trial' (i.e.
a trial ' lege' and not a ' cognitio' of the governor)
rather than 'calling on the laws (establishing the
'provocatio').
3
 Such exceptions are found in the title of the
Digest dealing with the lex Cornelia de sicariis et
veneficis (Dig. 48, 8), e.g. 'transfugas licet, ubicum-
que inventi fuerint, quasi hostes interficere' (§§ 3, 6),
a principle which is itself sufficient to prove the
maintenance of this military jurisdiction during the
Republic : and in § 16 a general prohibition is limited
by the clause ' nisi forte tumultus aliter sedari non
possit.'
4
 There was a general prescription to governors to
clear their provinces of disreputable characters (UU
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to see real exceptions in these apparent
violations of the law. They seem to show a
division of competence between the central
courts and those of, at least, the ' public'
provinces, which appear to have the right to
execute capital sentences on Roman citizens
in the case of ordinary crimes. I t is hardly
an accident that, while the instances of the
violation of the law are apparently of this
latter type, the cases which illustrate it are
cases of treason, or at least of disturbance
of the public peace, in Caesar's provinces.
Whatever view may be taken of the motive
for the persecution of the Christians under
Trajan, it appears certain that the crime for
which they were tried was technically one
of treason.1 The distinction drawn by
Mommsen 2 and Ramsay 3 between the police
supervision of the governor and regular
legal trial, is only valid with reference to
procedure, not with reference to the con-
ception of crime. Whether the governor
proceeds ' lege ' or ' imperio' the punishment
must be directed against a definite crime
known to Roman law. The choice lies
between 'vis publica' and 'majestas,' and as
in the case of the Christians we are dealing
with illicit associations, it was most probably
the latter.4 In the case of St. Paul, the
readiness of Festus to admit the ' appeal' of
the prisoner does not seem to have been
based mainly on the fact of his Roman
citizenship—this indeed was not made the
ground of the appeal,—but on the unwilling-
ness of a subordinate official, a mere agent
of the emperor (procwrator pro legato), to
pronounce on the gravity of a political
charge after the appeal to his immediate
superior had been made. It is difficult to
estimate the standpoint from which the
pian in Dig. 1, 18,13 : 'congruitbongetgravipraesidi
curare—ut malis hominibus provincia careat eosque
eonquirat: nam et sacrilegos latrones plagiarios fures
conquirere debet et prout quisque deliquerit in enm
animadvertere'), but this of itself could hardly have
empowered governors to violate the provisions of the
'lex Julia.'
1
 It was the offence provided for by the 'lex
Julia de majestate' (Dig. 48, 4, 1) in the clause
' quove cottus conventusve fiat hominesve ad sedi-
tionem convocentur.'
2
 Historische Zeitschrift, xxviii. p. 398.
s
 The Church in the Roman Empire, p. 209.4
 Ulpian in Dig. 47, 22, 2, ' quisquis illicitum
collegium usurpaverit, ea poena tenetur, qua tenentur,
qui hominibus armatis loca publica vel templa occu-
passe judicati sunt' (Dig. 48, 4, 1). That the cases
tried by Pliny were technically those of ' majestas'
seems also shown by his torture of the 'ancilla'
(ad Traj. 96). Slaves could only be tortured against
their masters in cases of incest, adultery, and
'majestas,' a principle that would have applied
directly to the accused who were 'cives,' and might
have been extended to ' peregrini.'
eastern mind regarded the position of the
Princeps, but it is difficult to believe that
St. Paul's words, ' I am standing before
Caesar's judgment seat where I ought to be
judged—I appeal unto Caesar' could have
been spoken to a proconsul of a senatorial
province. Any court of the Roman world
is certainly not ' Caesar's judgment seat' in
the early Principate.
Where, on the other hand, we find
exemption from punishment claimed by St.
Paul in virtue of his Roman citizenship, it
is not from punishment following condem-
nation but from punishment without trial.5
The negative and positive instances, which
form our sole means of interpreting the ' lex
Julia,' may perhaps show that this law was
either limited from the first, or was
interpreted as being limited, to the
' coercitio ' consequent on summary political
jurisdiction,6 and that the provincial courts
(at least in the public provinces) did
exercise a large amount of capital juris-
diction over Roman citizens in their own
right.
A conclusion, such as the current view on
this subject, which has seemed to be
established by the grouping together of a
series of apparently similar passages, may
often be modified by a detailed examination
of the evidence. Each procedure has its
own inherent weakness; in discussing
fragmentary evidence one may be too
critical as well as uncritical; but the
former practice is the more dangerous, for
such an exercise of constructive power
often tends to ignore possible differences of
circumstances and conflicting evidence at
the moment when the collective correspond-
ence is observed. I t has been my main
business here to give the negative evidence,
and a comparison of this with the positive
' data' has led me to the following
conclusions:—
(i.) That there was probably no enact-
ment extending the ' provocatio' in the
later period of the Republic, but that the
rules observed with respect to jurisdiction
over Roman citizens were a part of
5
 At Philippi: ' They have beaten us publicly, un-
condemned, men that are Romans, and have cast us
into prison.' At Jerusalem: 'Is it lawful for you
to scourge a man that is a Roman and uncondemned ?'
These passages lend colour to Huschke's restoration
of a passage in the lex Julia (Paul. Sent. 5, 26, 1),
in which he reads ' lege Julia de vi publica damnatur,
qui aliqua potestate praeditus civem Romanum—
eumve nondum condemnaverit in publica vincula
duci jussit' (for 'Condemnaverit inve, &c.').
6
 This is probably the sense in which it is treated
by Ulpian and Paulus, and is the only possible
meaning which it can have as cited in the Digest.
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customary law (consuetudo). In consequence
a breach of these rules was not a specific
crime, but could be punished only by the
extraordinary power of the ' comitia' which
knew no limits to the conception of
' perduellio.'
(ii.) That the first positive enactment,
enjoining a penalty, was the ' lex Julia de
vi publica.' I t probably referred to
extraordinary jurisdiction in political cases.
Perhaps ordinary capital jurisdiction over
Roman citizens was in the case of certain
crimes extended to all the provinces, and
the right to exercise extraordinary juris-
diction seems to have been recognized in
certain cases in the ' public ' provinces.
(iii.) There is no evidence for a universal
appeal to Caesar, resting on a denial of the
jurisdiction of all governors over Roman
citizens, although there appears to have
been some such appeal in certain cases from
the emperor's delegates.
Our researches into this question must be
limited to the early Principate, since such a
principle, if it ever existed, must have
become merged in the universal criminal
appeal to the emperor which subsequently
grew up. We can hardly imagine that it
was thought necessary to keep up this
denial of jurisdiction when every criminal
case could go ultimately before the High
Court. I t would probably have been
extinct by the time of the Antonines, and
the extension of citizenship to the Roman
world by Caracalla was not necessary to
render it meaningless.
A. H. J. GBEENIDGE.
THE ORTHOGRAPHY OF EARLY LATIN MINTJSCOXE MSS.
IN part ix. (1895) of his Paleographie des
Classiques latins M. Chatelain gives a photo-
graph (pi. 116) of a page of the famous
Codex Puteaneus of Livy, an uncial MS. of
the fifth century, which belonged to the
Abbey of Corbie, and another (pi. 117) of a
page of the ninth century minuscule MS. of
Livy in the Vatican (Regin. 762). The
Vatican MS. is a copy, made at Tours, of
the Puteaneus which had been borrowed
from Corbie. The two photographs in M.
Chatelain's collection exhibit the same
passage of Livy; and M. Chatelain points
out that the scribe of Tours has in some
instances deviated from the orthography of
his original, in writing, for example, sub-
plicatio instead of STJPPLICATIO of the
uncial MS. and apsumptis instead of AB-
SUMPTIS.
Our editions of a large number of Latin
authors depend on minuscule MSS. of the
Carlovingian period, and the spelling
adopted by editors is generally that of
some early MS. of this kind. Thus the two
last editors of Nonius Marcellus, Prof.
Lucian Mueller and Mr. Onions, follow the
orthography of the Leyden MS. (Voss. Lat.
Fol. 73), which is, like the Vatican Livy, a
ninth century MS. of Tours. That MS.
differs from others in exhibiting spellings
which are recognized as the probable spell-
ings of Nonius himself ; e.g. adpetentes 28
M. 25, iwtuere 32, 34, inmittere 34, 2, sub-
plantare and subponere 36, 3, where
other MSS. have the modernized spellings,
appetentes, irruere, immittere, sUpplantare,
supponere. By the well-known canon of
textual criticism, that mediaeval scribes
may be supposed to have changed un-
familiar to familiar forms but not familiar
to unfamiliar, we infer that the scribe of
the Leyden MS. reproduced the orthography
of his original, while the scribes of the
other MSS. have changed the unfamiliar
spellings adpetentes, etc. to the familiar
forms, appetentes, etc.
But what becomes of this canon, if it
can be shown that in a definite instance of
a minuscule copy of an uncial original, the
mediaeval scribe has deliberately inserted
' archaisms' like subplicatio, apsumptis, which
were not found in his original? If this
was a common practice of mediaeval scribes
in general, or the monks of Tours in par-
ticular, the orthography of our Latin
editions, which cannot at the best be said
to be securely established, becomes very
insecure indeed. It seemed to me, after
reading this remark of M. Chatelain's, that
it was absolutely necessary to determine
how far this substitution of ' archaic' for
' modern' forms was carried in the Vatican
Livy; and I took the opportunity of a
recent visit to Rome to examine the treat-
ment in this MS. of prepositions in com-
pounds and of words like apud (aput), sed
(set), etc. For this purpose I collated (not
very minutely, but sufficiently for the pur-
